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Abstract. As smart bands make life more convenient and provide a positive life-
style, many people are now using them. Since smart bands deal with private in-
formation, security design and implementation for smart band system become 
necessary. To make a trustworthy smart band, we must derive the security re-
quirements of the system first, and then design the system satisfying the security 
requirements. In this paper, we apply threat modeling techniques such as Data 
Flow Diagram, STRIDE, and Attack Tree to the smart band system to identify 
threats and derive security requirements accordingly. Through threat modeling, 
we found the vulnerabilities of the smart band system and successfully exploited 
smart bands with them. To defend against these threats, we propose security 
measures and verify that they are secure by using Scyther which is a tool for 
automatic verification of security protocol. 
Keywords: Smart Band, Threat Modeling, Security Requirement Analysis. 
1 Introduction 
Smart band automatically measures the number of steps, heart rate, and sleep time, 
helping a user to have a positive lifestyle. Also, It is connected to a smartphone and 
performs various functions such as alerting the user when the smartphone receives mes-
sages, monitoring the current user state, setting the alarm, etc. As these functions have 
a direct impact on daily life, the smart band system requires a high level of trustworthi-
ness. If an attack becomes successful, then sensitive health information and private in-
formation can be leaked (e.g., moving path, daily life pattern, etc.). Also, the attacker 
can obtain control of the smart band and use it freely. 
Many studies have uncovered attacks and vulnerabilities of smart bands. Zhou et al. 
analyzed threats of a commercial fitness tracker and found that it transmits the login 
information and data in plaintext without encryption [1]. Lee et al. succeeded in detect-
ing weakness of wearable service and set up attack scenarios [2]. Goyal et al. obtained 
private data of wearable health tracker and conducted DoS attack successfully [3]. Sen-
eviratne et al. analyzed security threats of wearable devices based on three categories: 
Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability [4]. These studies show that many devices 
have been released with vulnerabilities. If smart bands are commercialized with un-
known vulnerabilities, the user's privacy and sensitive information can not be protected. 
Therefore, in order to construct a trustworthy smart band system, it should be able to 
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respond to unknown vulnerabilities as well as known ones and clearly identify attack 
points. 
The trustworthy system refers to a system that can operate safely in any situation 
considering availability, reliability, security, and safety [5, 6]. A series of processes for 
developing and operating the trustworthy system is called information assurance. 
Achieving information assurance requires the step-by-step assurance from the security 
requirements analysis and design to the implementation and operation of the system. 
The most important part in achieving information assurance is to derive security re-
quirements because the whole system is designed and implemented taking into account 
the security requirements of the system. 
In this paper, we apply threat modeling techniques such as Data Flow Diagram [7, 
8], STRIDE [9, 10], and Attack Tree [11] to the smart band system to identify security 
threats and derive security requirements accordingly. With this process, it can respond 
to unknown vulnerabilities as well as known ones and identify attack points in advance. 
For example, we could find a vulnerability in the connection process for the smart bands 
and successfully gain system privilege by using the vulnerability found by threat mod-
eling. To deal with the connection problem and other vulnerabilities, we provide secure 
connection and communication protocols. Also, we present a simple and practical (con-
sidering the smart band environment) key exchange protocol for encryption in secure 
connection process. Finally, we verify the security measures using an automatic verifi-
cation tool. An overview of the proposed approach is shown in Fig. 1. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Overview of the proposed approach. 
 
Contributions. The contributions of this paper are as follows: 
─ We derive vulnerabilities and security requirements for the smart band system. 
These are useful for the service providers to construct the trustworthy system achiev-
ing information assurance. 
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─ We demonstrate that threat modeling analysis is effective in deriving threats and 
attack scenarios for smart bands with a real experiment. We found a vulnerability on 
smart band connection process. Using this vulnerability, an attacker can spoof an 
authorized user to take control of the smart band and use it like the normal user. 
─ We propose security measures to solve the problem on the connection process and 
protect the smart band system. Considering the hardware characteristics of smart 
bands, the measures are designed to be simple and easy to apply to the system. Also, 
we validate the measures using Scyther [12] which is an automatic verification tool. 
2 Preliminaries 
2.1 Security of smart band 
Zhou et al. analyzed the threat of the commercial fitness tracker [1]. The fitness tracker, 
as called Fitbit, transmits the login information and HTTP data in plaintext without 
encryption when communicating with the web server. This allows attackers to access 
data easily without authentication. To handle this vulnerability, Rahman et al. proposed 
FitLock methodology [13]. However, a risky attack is still possible even if FitLock is 
applied to the system. Therefore, for the fitness trackers that are connected to the online 
networks, it is necessary to analyze the vulnerabilities more closely and to design secu-
rity measures against them. Lee et al. analyzed the system to find the vulnerability of 
wearable service with the perspective of devices, gateways and server [2]. They set up 
three attack scenarios: Pairing to unauthorized devices, information leakage from fake 
gateways, and malicious code injection. After that, those scenarios were applied to a 
commercial smart band, and they proved that the attacks were successful. Finally, a 
secure authentication procedure is proposed to prevent those attack scenarios. Goyal et 
al. analyzed wearable health trackers, focusing on the security and privacy issue [3]. 
They showed how these devices are vulnerable to several attacks and formulated an 
assessment table after security analysis. They used GattTool for gaining access to user's 
private data and simulated DoS attack with the commercialized devices. Also, they 
modified the source code of the mobile application to get the user's data. Furthermore, 
they found HTTP and SSL vulnerabilities in the server certificate validation. Fereidooni 
et al. analyzed 17 wearable devices and revealed severe vulnerabilities which can be 
exploited easily [14]. They demonstrated that they could get the user's private data and 
modify the data of the device directly by spoofing the authenticated user. They con-
cluded that End-to-End encryption should be implemented and a digital signature must 
be used in the fitness tracker's communication protocol. 
According to these researches, many of the devices were released with errors while 
they were not aware of the vulnerability. If a smart band with the unknown vulnerability 
is commercialized, the users that purchased the device are not protected against the 
threats. Therefore, it is necessary to progress threat analysis with threat modeling to 
detect not only unknown vulnerabilities but also known ones in advance. The provider 
of the smart band must apply security measures to make the system secure and trust-
worthy. 
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2.2 Data Flow Diagrams (DFD) 
To find out and reveal attack surfaces and attack vectors explicitly, we need to under-
stand the whole system of the smart band. With Data Flow Diagrams, we can abstract 
the system structure and see the data flow of the system at a glance. Because DFD 
describes the data flows of the components in a system, it is ideal for threat modeling  
[7]. Through the abstraction process, it can remove parts that are not necessary to be 
analyzed and make it easy to understand the whole structure of the system and the flow 
of data [8]. Because attacks usually occur as data flows, especially when the data 
crosses the trust boundary, we need to clarify what happens as data flows cross trust 
boundaries. Therefore, security experts must draw DFD that describes the flow of data 
clearly to identify the vulnerabilities in advance. Also, since DFD is drawn on an ele-
mental basis, it is easy to find element-level vulnerabilities. The elements of DFD are 
described in the below. 
• External entity (Rectangle). The external entity is any entity outside the system 
that interacts with inner elements. It generates the input and takes the output from a 
process. 
• Process (Circle). The process is a task that performs functions to handle data within 
the application. It takes inputs and generates outputs for the function. This is neces-
sary when exchanging data between different elements. 
• Data flow (Directed arrow). The data flow represents the data transmission be-
tween other elements. The direction of data flow can be represented by the arrow. 
• Data store (Two parallel lines). The data store is used for storing data in the system. 
It only stores and transmits the data, but it cannot perform functions with the data. 
• Trust boundary (Red dashed lines). The trust boundary describes the borderline 
where the trust level changes. This makes it easy to identify where the privilege 
changes and where the data comes from the untrusted sources. 
2.3 STRIDE 
STRIDE is a classification scheme developed by Microsoft for grouping threats into 
categories [9, 10]. It is derived from an acronym for the following six threat categories, 
Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information disclosure, Denial of service, and Ele-
vation of privilege. The detailed explanation of STRIDE is as follows:. 
• Spoofing. An attacker pretends to be an authorized user so that the attacker can get 
access to the target of the whole system and get user’s authentication information. 
• Tampering. An attacker modifies data to deceive the user. The target data is usually 
in a data store or data flow between entities. 
• Repudiation. An attacker denies performing an action, such as getting or sending 
data and it makes it difficult to identify who does malicious actions. 
• Information disclosure. The information is exposed to an attacker unauthorized to 
access it. For dealing with this problem, it is necessary to prevent tampering the 
privilege and care about the point where data leaks. 
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• Denial of service. An attacker interrupts the user to get the resource of services. To 
prevent it, availability and reliability of the system should be improved. 
• Elevation of privilege. An attacker gains the privilege without proper authorization 
process. After an attack is completed successfully, an attacker can gain access and 
penetrate to the system. 
Using DFD together, we can easily identify the attack points of the target system. 
STRIDE can be applied to various fields because there is no restriction on the analysis 
system and it consists of standardized analysis processes. Dev et al. analyzed the vul-
nerability of the Google Chrome API using STRIDE, showing the possibility of various 
threats [15]. They provided security guidelines to developers and informed developers 
of Chrome-extensions vulnerabilities that can occur depending on the functionality of 
the APIs. Karahasanovic et al. analyzed the vulnerability of automobiles adopted IoT 
technology using both STRIDE and TARA techniques in accordance with AUTOSAR 
standards of automobiles [16]. They designed the template of threat modeling to con-
trive a security mechanism that will be useful for the autonomous mobile industry. 
Cagnazzo et al. analyzed the threat of mobile health systems that are connected with 
IoT devices, using STRIDE threat model [17]. They especially focused on the network, 
such as BAN, WLAN. They abstracted the mobile health system with DFD. After threat 
modeling, they proposed possible mitigation strategies that apply encryption techniques 
and authentication to the system. 
Using STRIDE is helpful to find the vulnerability of the target easily. Therefore, we 
found out vulnerabilities of smart bands using STRIDE and proposed security measures 
against them in this paper. 
2.4 Scyther 
Scyther is an open source automatic tool that demonstrates the security of the protocols 
used on the Internet and open networks. Compared with other automatic analysis tools, 
the analysis is possible without using abstraction technology, and the speed of verifica-
tion is faster than others. Scyther is also widely used for educational purposes to better 
understand the protocol configuration, and it was used in research papers to verify the 
safety of protocol [12]. Basin et al. analyzed the vulnerability using Scyther and sug-
gested security measures to prevent it in the ISO/IEC 9798 standard protocol [18]. After 
this, ISO updated the standard protocol and distributed it. Cremers, C. proceeded to 
formalize the Internet key exchange protocol and analyzed the phase of it so that they 
found an unknown vulnerability of the protocol using Scyther [19]. Also, they provided 
the most comprehensive view of the security properties for IKE protocols. 
3 Threat Modeling 
In this section, we analyze the vulnerabilities and threats of the smart band system. 
Threat analysis is performed for basic services provided by the smart band including 
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notification, alarm, data transmission. The threat analysis process is conducted through 
security threat modeling, and the steps are as follow: 
1. After defining the boundary and scope of the system, we identify important assets. 
At this time, DFD is drawn to clarify asset identification and threat analysis. 
2. Based on the DFD, we apply STRIDE model to the system to derive possible threats. 
3. The threats derived from STRIDE model could be used to attack the smart band 
system. By drawing attack tree, we can learn how the threats can be used in attacks. 
3.1 Data Flow Diagram of Smart Band System 
We draw DFD to analyze the threats of the smart band system and identify data flows. 
Because the attacker usually attacks when the target data crosses the trust boundary, it 
is easy to identify the security threats if DFD is correctly drawn. 
As shown in the DFD from Fig. 2 the smartphone, the smart band, and the web server 
exchange the user information. If attackers can get this information, they can violate 
privacy and use the information for a malicious purpose. Therefore, we define the main 
assets of the smart band system as the user information and the smart band service itself. 
The system is analyzed focusing on the user information and the smart band service. 
The smart band system could be divided into three parts and the description of each 
part is following: 
 
Fig. 2. Data Flow Diagram of smart band system 
─ The upper part of Fig. 2 shows the process of exchanging data between the web 
server and the user's smartphone. The ID and password entered in the smartphone 
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(E1) are sent to the web server to authenticate the user (P1) and then transmitted to 
the web server database (D2). The web server transmits the user information of the 
corresponding ID and the application data (P2) to the smart band application store 
(D1). Also, the application sends the measured data, such as the number of steps and 
the heart rate, to the web server database. 
─ The center of Fig. 2 shows the process of connection and exchanging data between 
the user's smartphone and the smart band. When the smartphone receives a message, 
it checks the type of the message and transmits notification information to the appli-
cation (P3). The smart band application requests the connection and sends the 
smartphone information to the smart band to connect with the smart band (E3). The 
smart band establishes a connection by transmitting a response and band information 
(P4). When the connection is completed, the smart band goes through a synchroni-
zation process and updates the measured data to the application (P5). After that, the 
application transmits notification information to the smart band along with the noti-
fication request (P6). 
─ The lower part of Fig. 2 shows the process of exchanging data between the author-
ized user (E2) and the application, and alerting the user. The smart band transmits 
the notification information to the authorized user (P7) by vibrating and displaying 
icons or numbers. The authorized user sends application setting information, such as 
timer alarm, to the application and gets the smart band data from the application 
(P8).  
3.2 STRIDE Threat Analysis 
In the above, we defined the main asset of the smart band system as the user information 
and the service itself. Considering the main assets of the system, we set the attacker’s 
goal to obtain the user information and conduct denial of service attack. We have ap-
plied the STRIDE model to identify the possible threats of smart band service. For ap-
plying STRIDE model to the smart band system, we used Microsoft Threat Modeling 
tool. Microsoft Threat Modeling tool [20, 21] generates the report of threat modeling 
automatically based on the DFD. It automatically derives 147 threats. Considering the 
previous researches on smart bands security [1]-[4], [13, 14], [17], [22], we select 33 
important threats that could be applied to achieve the attacker's goal and enumerate 
them in Table 1. 
Table 1. STRIDE threat analysis of smart band system 
Element Type Threat Description 
E1. Smartphone 
S T1. Attacker spoofs smartphone to get user information. 
R T2. Attacker sends data and denies this later. 
E2.  
Authorized User 
S T3. Attacker spoofs an authorized user to manipulate application data. 
R T4. Attacker sets application data and denies this later. 
P1.  S T5. Attacker spoofs the smartphone or web server to obtain ID/ PW of user 
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Authentication or access permission for information exchange.  
T T6. Attacker modifies ID/ PW of user to disturb authentication. 
I T7. Attacker obtains ID/ PW. 
D 
T8. Attacker makes it impossible to perform the normal authentication 
through excessive authentication requests. 
E T9. Attacker gives the higher privilege to someone who does not have it. 
P2. Exchange 
User Infor-
mation 
S 
T10. Attacker spoofs the authorized user’s smartphone to transmit wrong 
data or gain access to the transmitted data.  
T T11. Attacker modifies application data or user information and transmits it. 
I T12. Attacker obtains user information or application data. 
D 
T13. Attacker makes it impossible to exchange data through excessive data 
transmission. 
E 
T14. Attacker gives the privilege to someone who could not access to appli-
cation information and user information. 
P4. Connection 
S T15. Attacker pretends to be an authorized user to control smart band. 
T 
T16. Attacker modifies the smartphone/ smart band information and trans-
mits them. 
I 
T17. Attacker obtains smartphone/ smart band information and connection 
information. 
D 
T18. Attacker makes it impossible to connect through an excessive connec-
tion request. 
E 
T19. Attacker gives the privilege to someone who could not access to con-
nection information. 
P6. Request 
Notifications 
S 
T20. Attacker spoofs the authorized user’s smartphone to transmit wrong 
notification information. 
T T21. Attacker modifies notification information and transmits it. 
I T22. Attacker obtains notification information. 
D 
T23. Attacker makes it impossible to transmit the normal notification request 
through excessive notification requests. 
E 
T24. Attacker gives the privilege to someone who could not access notifica-
tion request. 
D1. Smart Band 
Application 
Storage 
T T25. Attacker modifies the data in the storage and inserts wrong data. 
I 
T26. Attacker accesses the datastore and obtains application information 
and user information in the storage. 
D T27. Attacker inserts data too much so that the storage does not work 
9 
properly. 
D2. Web Server 
Database 
T 
T28. Attacker modifies the data in the web server database and inserts 
wrong data. 
I 
T29. Attacker accesses the database and obtains application information and 
user information in the web server database. 
D T30. Attacker transmits data excessively to disturb normal data exchange. 
P1 → D2 
T 
T31. Attacker modifies authentication result so that the authorized user 
could not access web server database, or an unauthorized user could access 
web server database. 
I T32. Attacker obtains authentication result. 
D 
T33. Attacker transmits authentication data excessively to disturb the nor-
mal authentication. 
3.3 Attack Tree 
Attack tree is a tool to arrange possible attacks on the system hierarchically, and so it 
is helpful to find attack scenario of the system [11]. We construct attack trees to find 
possible attack scenarios on the smart band system by analyzing the association be-
tween the threats derived from STRIDE model and the attacker’s goal. When designing 
the attack tree, we did not consider the side-channel attack, social engineering attack, 
and outside of the smart band system boundary. We refer to research papers previously 
studied on smart bands and wearable devices security [1]-[4], [13, 14], [17], [22] and 
results of STRIDE threat analysis for the reasonable attack trees.  
The root nodes of the attack trees are the attacker’s ultimate goals, and the leaf nodes 
are attacks. To achieve the ultimate goals, the attackers can use one of the leaf nodes. 
As we descend along the tree, we can come up with an attack scenario. We created two 
trees based on two targets of the attacker and described for each tree. The attack trees 
are shown in Fig. 3. 
 
Smart Band Denial of Service. Smart band denial of service could be achieved by 
accomplishing one of the following goals: `Transmit Malicious Information to User’, 
`Excessive Data Transmission’, and `Taking over the Smart Band Control’. 
1. To transmit malicious information to the user, an attacker saves previously transmit-
ted information and retransmits it later(A1). Also, the attacker modifies data and 
inserts it(A2). For these attack, spoofing an authorized user or getting the higher 
privilege could be used to access and modify the information. By packet sniffing 
during data transmission, an attacker could save the packets and retransmit the same 
packets. 
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Fig. 3. Attack tree for smart band system 
2. In the case of excessive data transmission(A3), it is possible to interrupt the use of 
the smart band service by transmitting excessive data and making the smart band 
vibrate continuously. To perform the attack effectively, attackers could target the 
user authentication process or the process of exchanging user information. 
3. Attacks that prevent the use of smart band services by taking over the smart band 
control are achieved by connecting the smart band to the device of the attacker(A4) 
and stealing account of the normal user(A5). An attacker can connect to a smart band 
by pretending to be an authorized user during the connection process. Also, an at-
tacker can acquire the user information during the authentication process to perform 
the account theft attack. 
Get User Information. Getting user information could be achieved by accomplishing 
one of the following goals: `Obtain Data from Datastore’, `Get the Authorized User 
Privilege’, and `Network Traffic Sniffing’. 
1. To obtain data from datastore, an attacker gets data from user’s phone or smart band 
by using file recovery tools or injecting malicious codes in them(A6). These attacks 
can occur with an attacker having access to the datastore. Alternatively, an attacker 
can spoof as a normal user or elevate the privilege to do unauthorized conducts. 
2. The user information can be obtained by acquiring the authorized user privilege. 
This can be done by bypassing the login procedure(A7) and stealing the authorized 
user account(A8). For these attacks, an attacker can target the authentication process 
or the user information exchange process. 
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3. An attacker obtains information through network traffic sniffing when the data is 
transmitted [22]. An attacker can obtain the user information by sniffing the trans-
mitted data(A9) during the communication between the smartphone and the web 
server or during the communication between the smartphone and the smart band. 
In addition to the threats mentioned above, attackers can attempt to combine various 
threats derived from STRIDE threat analysis. Based on the threats and attack scenarios 
derived from threat modeling, we exploited vulnerabilities in the connection process of 
the smart bands and successfully gained system privilege. Our attack demo video can 
be found on the following website: https://youtu.be/QFb1AV7yUas [23]. If the smart 
band and the normal user's smartphone are already connected, the attacker could not 
easily connect the smart band. However, if they are not connected, the attacker could 
easily gain access to the smart band (see Fig. 4). This attack is possible because the 
smart band did not check whether the smartphone is an authorized device or not when 
connecting the smart band to the smartphone. If the user left the smart band, an attacker 
can acquire the smart band physically and connect it to the attacker’s device without 
the user authentication process. Using this vulnerability, the attacker can spoof an au-
thorized user to take control of the smart band and use the smart band like the normal 
user. Therefore, user authentication process is necessary for secure connection and we 
propose it in 4.2. This experiment confirms that our threat modeling method is effective 
in detecting system vulnerabilities. 
 
Fig. 4. Attack scenarios using vulnerabilities on the connection process. 
4 Security Requirements and Security Measures 
In this section, we derive the security requirements of the smart band system and pro-
vide security measures satisfying the security requirements and validate the security 
measures. 
4.1 Security Requirements 
As mentioned above, the attacker’s ultimate goals are `Smart Band Denials of Service’ 
and `Get User Information’. Since the security requirement is intended to prevent the 
attackers from achieving their goals when we derive security requirements, we consider 
the attack scenarios obtained from the attack tree. 
Attacker Normal User
Try Connection Disconnected
Connection
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• Adding timestamp in the packet. To prevent the replay attack(A1), timestamp 
should be added in the packet for all data exchange process and connection process. 
• Authentication. Even if an attacker modifies a message, message authentication 
process can detect it and prevent inserting modified information(A2). Also, the user 
authentication process should be used to prevent connecting to an attacker’s device 
(A4), stealing account(A5, A8), and bypassing the login process(A7). 
• Encryption. Encryption makes it difficult for an attacker to read the original mes-
sage and modify it. Therefore, packet encryption process should be used for prevent-
ing message modification(A2) and network packet sniffing(A9). Also, all sensitive 
data in the database must be encrypted before saving it. Then, even if the attacker 
gets the physical storage, the attacker cannot read the data(A6). 
• Traffic analysis and intrusion detection. It is difficult to block the excessive data 
transmission(A3) entirely. Therefore we need to mitigate it through traffic analysis 
and intrusion detection on the server-side.  
• Secure account management. All the users must manage their accounts securely to 
prevent stealing account(A5, A8). The service provider should keep informing the 
user of the risk of account theft and manage the datastore securely.  
4.2 Security Measures 
Looking at the smart band DFD and security requirements, two major parts require 
authentication and encryption when transmitting a packet. The first part is the commu-
nication between the smartphone and the web server. When a packet comes and goes 
between a smartphone and a web server, the packet must have authentication infor-
mation for the user and be encrypted. The second part is the communication between 
the smartphone and smart band. In this case, a secure connection is necessary to solve 
the problem of the connection process mentioned above. For the secure connection, 
encryption and the key generation process for encryption are essential. In this subsec-
tion, we present security protocols and a simple and practical (considering the smart 
band environment) key exchange protocol. 
 
Communication between Smartphone and Web Server. The communication be-
tween the smartphone and the web server is divided into two phases. The first step is 
the login phase. To communicate with the web server, the user first logs in and sends 
data to the web server. In this process, authentication and data encryption procedures 
are needed to prevent attacks such as replay attack, login bypass, and account theft. The 
second step is the data transmission phase. In this process, the symmetric key encryp-
tion algorithm is used because the data size may be large. In exchange of the symmetric 
key, we use the station-to-station protocol [24]. Another secure protocol could be used 
for the key exchange instead. After key exchange, we should encrypt the timestamp, 
each identification information, and data for communication. It is assumed that the cer-
tificates of smartphone and web server are exchanged through secure channels. The 
formal security measure is shown in Fig. 5 The procedure is as follows: 
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Fig. 5. Smartphone and web server communication protocol 
1. The smartphone encrypts timestamp, the user ID, and hashed password using the 
public key of the web server. 
2. The web server decrypts the encrypted contents using the private key of the web 
server to obtain the timestamp, the smartphone user ID, and the hashed password. 
3. The web server verifies the validity of the timestamp and checks the corresponding 
ID and hashed password. If it passes normally, the web server approves the login. 
4. Obtain a symmetric key for communication between the smartphone and the web 
server using the station-to-station protocol. 
5. The smartphone and the web server use the symmetric key to encrypt the timestamp, 
the identification information, and the data. 
Connection and Communication between Smartphone and Smart Band. The se-
cure connection between smartphone and smart band is necessary so that an attacker 
cannot connect the smart band to the attacker’s device. To establish a secure connec-
tion, the smart band must store the smartphone information of the authorized user and 
carry out the user authentication during the connection process and data transmission 
process. When transmitting the user smartphone information to the smart band, it must 
be encrypted. For encryption, it is necessary to exchange a symmetric key. We propose 
a simple symmetric key generation process for encryption (see Fig. 6). U1, U2, B1, B2, 
B3, P1, P2, and P3 denote the order of action of the user (U), the smart band (B), and 
the smartphone (P) respectively. The random number generator is assumed to be secure 
because it is out of the scope of this paper. The process is as follows: 
1. The smartphone requests a connection to the smart band (P1). 
2. The smart band that receives the connection request transmits a response message 
and displays a number on the screen to inform the user of a specific number (B1). 
3. The smartphone receives a response message and changes the screen for the user to 
input the number (P2). 
Smartphone Web Server
1. Epkw (T, ID, h(PW))
2. Decrypt & get T, IDs, h(PW)
3. Check T & verify h(PW)4. Exchange symmetric key K
by station to station protocol
5. EK (T, Data) Epkw
T
ID
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K
: Encryption
: Public key of web server
: Time stamp
: Identification of user
: Hashed password
: Symmetric key
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Fig. 6. Symmetric key generation process for secure connection 
4. The user reads the number on the smart band and presses a button (U1). Then, the 
smart band generates a symmetric key (B2). 
5. The user inputs the number into the smartphone (U2). Then, the smartphone gener-
ates a symmetric key (P3). 
Since this key generation process is used for the initial connection setting and the user 
reads the number and inputs it into the smartphone directly, it is reasonable to assume 
that the symmetric key generation is secure. After exchanging the symmetric key, the 
smartphone encrypts the connection request message and timestamp with the symmet-
ric key and transmits it. When the smart band receives and decrypts the message, If the 
message format is wrong, then the smart band ignores it. After the connection setup is 
completed, the smartphone and the smart band encrypt timestamp and data and send 
the encrypted contents whenever they want to communicate. If the user wants to con-
nect the smart band to a new smartphone, the old smartphone transmits the disconnec-
tion request in the data field to release the smartphone connection. The formal security 
measure for connection and communication between smartphone and smart band is 
shown in Fig. 7. It is assumed that the symmetric key exchange process has been exe-
cuted in advance through the method mentioned earlier. The procedure is as follows: 
1. The smartphone encrypts the timestamp and the connection request message with 
the symmetric key and sends the encrypted contents.  
2. The smart band decrypts the message and checks the message format. If the format 
is wrong, the smart band ignores the message. 
3. The smart band encrypts the timestamp and the connection response message with 
the symmetric key and sends the encrypted contents.  
4. For communication, encrypts the timestamp and data with the symmetric key and 
transmits the encrypted contents.  
3)  Wait for the input(P2)
1234 1234
2) Display a number (B1)
1234 12344-2) Generate
a symmetric key (B2)
5-2) Generate 
a symmetric key (P3)
Symmetric 
Key 
K = k1 = k2
Secure 
Random 
Number 
Generator(F)
k1 = F(1234) k2 = F(1234)
4-1) Read the number and 
press the button (U1)
5-1) Input the number 
on the screen (U2)
1) Connection Request (P1)
2) Response (B1)
Secure 
Random 
Number 
Generator(F)
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Fig. 7. Smartphone and smart band connection and communication protocol 
4.3 Verification of Security Measures 
We use Scyther to verify the security of the protocols mentioned above, and the results 
and codes are available in Github [25]. First, we verify the communication protocol 
between the smartphone and the web server. The process of exchanging the symmetric 
key using the station-to-station protocol is assumed to be safe and excluded from the 
verification. We checked the user ID (ID) the user password (PW) data transmitted be-
tween the smartphone and the web server (PhoneData, ServerData), the timestamp (T), 
and the symmetric key (kir) exchanged using the station-to-station protocol. As a result 
of verification of the protocol, all of them are secure and there is no attacker in the 
protocol. The Scyther verification code and result of smartphone and web server proto-
col is shown in Fig. 8. Second, we verify the communication and connection protocol 
between the smartphone and the smart band. The process of generating the symmetric 
key is assumed to be secure and is excluded from the verification Because it is used for 
the initial connection setting and the user reads the number and inputs it into the 
smartphone directly. We checked the smartphone connection request message (connec-
tionReq), the smart band connection response message(connectionRes), data transmit-
ted between the smartphone and the smart band (PhoneData, BandData), the timestamp 
(T), and the symmetric key (kir). As a result of verification of the protocol, all of them 
are secure and there is no attacker in the protocol. The Scyther verification code and 
result of the smartphone and smart band protocol is shown in Fig. 9. 
 
Smartphone Smart Band
1. EK (T, IDs)
2. Save IDs
3. EK(T, IDs or IDb, Data)
E
T
IDs
IDb
K
: Encryption
: Time stamp
: Identification of smartphone
: Identification of smart band
: Symmetric key
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Fig. 8. Scyther verification code and result of smartphone - web server protocol. 
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Fig. 9. Scyther verification code and result of smartphone - smart band protocol. 
5 Conclusion 
In this work, we derived vulnerabilities and security requirements for smart band 
system using threat modeling such as DFD, STRIDE, and Attack Tree. Vulnerabilities 
in the connection process of smart bands were found by analyzing the threats and at-
tacks obtained through threat modeling. By exploiting these vulnerabilities, we could 
gain the system privilege easily. This shows that our threat modeling method is effec-
tive in detecting vulnerabilities of smart band system and security requirements analysis 
is useful for rebuilding a smart band system. We proposed security measures to respond 
to vulnerabilities in the connection process and other possible attacks. To validate the 
18 
proposed security measures mathematically, we formalized the protocols and then ver-
ified that those measures are secure using Scyther. After establishing security measures 
against the threats and attacks derived from threat modeling, the system should be re-
built considering the security measures. Applying the security measures to the system 
can result in new problems such as key management. Therefore, it is important to check 
the security after rebuilding a system by repeating the methodology present in this paper 
for the secure system. 
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